Doctoral course on Analytical Models of Supply Chain Conflict and Coordination

After a short review of some fundamental concepts of calculus, optimization, and game theory, the afternoon of the first day was used to introduce and discuss the problem of double marginalization, which is one well-known and important source of inefficiencies in decentralized supply chains. On the following two days, the class dove deeper into various problems associated with incentive conflict in decentralized supply chains, discussing several different facets of this problem, and analyzing potential mitigation strategies. While analyzing research on various instances of incentive conflict, the class also discussed different mathematical models that are frequently used to study interactions between firms that might be cooperating within a supply chain, while at the same time competing on other dimensions.

Besides the aspects discussed in class, the students also enjoyed ample opportunities to discuss their own experiences and research agendas during the numerous coffee and lunch breaks. The course setting was very well organized and equipped, and the support staff was incredibly helpful and accommodating. The course was very well perceived, and the students' course feedback indicated that everyone felt they had a very interesting and valuable learning experience.